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Fig. 1. Overview of our visualization system: To support triage analysis in OT-networks, our visualization combines sensor readings with
results from an anomaly detection algorithm. Spiral plots encode readings and detection results in color and line thickness respectively.
An overview of the complete time frame is provided in a time slider and anomalies are highlighted.
Abstract—Operation technology networks, i.e. hard- and software used for monitoring and controlling physical/industrial processes,
have been considered immune to cyber attacks for a long time. A recent increase of attacks in these networks proves this assumption
wrong. Several technical constraints lead to approaches to detect attacks on industrial processes using available sensor data. This
setting differs fundamentally from anomaly detection in IT-network traffic and requires new visualization approaches adapted to
the common periodical behavior in OT-network data. We present a tailored visualization system that utilizes inherent features of
measurements from industrial processes to full capacity to provide insight into the data and support triage analysis by laymen and
experts. The novel combination of spiral plots with results from anomaly detection was implemented in an interactive system. The
capabilities of our system are demonstrated using sensor and actuator data from a real-world water treatment process with introduced
attacks. Exemplary analysis strategies are presented. Finally, we evaluate effectiveness and usability of our system and perform an
expert evaluation.
Index Terms—Cyber Security, Information Visualization, Anomaly Detection, Triage Analysis, Operation Technology Networks
1 INTRODUCTION
Over the last two decades, automation and thus the use of Operation
Technology (OT) networks in industry have increased rapidly, as have
attacks on such networks [8]. Network environments that are difficult
to update and the use of communication protocols that do not contain
authentication or encryption [23, 24] lead to high vulnerability once
an intruder has successfully breached the communication network. In
addition, historical reasons caused these networks to be less secured
against attacks than deemed appropriate for home and office IT [18].
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First, OT and IT networks are supposed to be physically separated.
Second, attacking OT networks is expected to be difficult due to their
highly application specific implementation. However, both of these
aspects have become obsolete nowadays. Commercial off-the-shelf
products in the industrial area such as Programmable Logic Controllers
(PLCs) facilitate set up, maintenance and operation of industrial appli-
cations by using common interfaces and programming libraries. This
also decreases the difficulties for attackers. Furthermore, new use
and business cases introduced as part of Industry 4.0 efforts [2] break
the physical separation of networks. Relying on the communication
and computation capabilities of (industrial) internet of things devices,
access routes to OT networks are created. Even if no such access is
possible, attackers have successfully managed to move laterally to the
OT networks in the past after breaking the IT network perimeter [10].
This lack in security has lead to recent research in cyber security with
the aim to detect attacks in already available information, such as
sensors monitoring the production process [9]. In network security,
periodic behavior is a signal for malware activity [17]. In contrast,
sensor data monitoring ongoing industrial processes oftentimes develop
periodic patterns, such that the absence of periodicity represents an
anomaly. Exploiting this fact, we developed a time-series visualiza-
tion based on spiral plots that combines sensor data with results from
anomaly detection. Thus providing not only an overview of the mea-
surements in normal operation but also indicating possible attacks, easy
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Fig. 2. Anomaly detection results: Readings of two sensors and anomaly
detection results for DPIT301. Chosen thresholds for categories II and
III are marked. The corresponding representation in our visualization
system is given.
to understand not only for cyber security trained personnel, but also for
non-security experts. Hence, an improvement of security by supervi-
sion of the data is also possible in factories without dedicated cyber
security personnel. The visualization was designed and evaluated to
support triage analysis.
In particular, our contributions are:
• We present a system for triage analysis that combines sensor-data
visualization and anomaly detection visualization.
• Analysis strategies are illustrated, that can be used to verify at-
tacks, analyze their causes, and to detect false alarms.
• We apply our system to real-world data from an OT-network in
an industrial water treatment process.
• We evaluate effectiveness and usability of the system for security
visualization experts as well as for laymen.
2 RELATED WORK
Our system combines methods for time series visualization, anomaly
detection, and detection and visualization of periodic behavior in moni-
tored networks. In the following, we briefly review relevant prior work
and discuss differences to our approach.
2.1 Time Series Visualization
Considering results from multiple sensors for a given time span, time
series data needs to be visualized. A thorough summary on visualization
of periodic and aperiodic time series data is given by Aigner et al. in [3].
For the special case of uncorrelated periodic time series, we chose the
well known spiral plot by Weber et al. [29]. A 3D adaption of spiral
plots was given by Tominski et al. [28]. Hu et al. use spiral plots to
visualize alarm floods and their patterns in complex industrial facility
monitoring [16]. To our knowledge, spiral plots for periodic time
series visualization were not yet combined with anomaly detection and
visualization.
2.2 Anomaly detection in time series
Industrial intrusion detection based on sensor data is a widely regarded
topic in cyber security research. Anomalies in the data are detected with
a plethora of different approaches. Schneider et al. use autoencoders
to detect anomalies in cyber-physical system networks [25], Goh et al.
and Feng et al. use neural networks for the detection [12,14]. One class
support vector machines are presented by Maglaras et al. as a machine
learning algorithm to detect novel and unknown attacks [21].
Results from different anomaly detection approaches have been
visualized in different ways. Stoffel et al. provide a visualization
combining multiple data sources that monitor a computer network [27].
Their visualization relies on well-known time series visualizations.
Combining these visualizations and highlighting of detected anomalies
facilitate shape, correlation and pattern recognition.
Karapistoli et al. detect selective forwarding and jamming attacks
in wireless sensor networks. Findings are then incorporated in graph
visualization and crossed views, providing an efficient and fast overview
of the network status [20].
While Boschetti et al. refrain from incorporating information on
detected anomalies directly in visualization [6], they use plots, his-
tograms, graphs and matrix visualization to provide information on
network traffic. Timesteps with a potential attack can be selected from
a list. The different visualizations then show the relevant time frame
thus providing information on the anomaly.
2.3 Detection and Visualization of Periodic Behavior
In OT networks, periodic behavior is the norm. In contrast, such
activities in monitored IT network activity are a sign of anomalies
and might indicate malware activity. Application of the discrete
Fourier transform allows Gove et al. to exhibit multiple period lengths
simultaneously from the monitored data [15]. Detected features can
then be grouped and sorted by cyber security relevant features. Periodic
behavior is visualized over multiple period lengths by potting the time
series and giving the results of the Fourier transformation. This enables
experts to compare and check for coordinated periodic activity. Huynh
et al. also aim on detecting periodic malware activity in their paper
“Uncovering Periodic Network Signals of Cyber Attacks” [4]. They
present a Fourier transform based periodicity detector that is able to
detect even complicated periodical traces in network traffic. Clustered
alerts are then visualized (amongst others) using a circular plot to
compare periodic behavior of different alerts.
Although many visualizations for anomaly and periodicity de-
tection exist, to our knowledge none consider detection of anomalies
in sensor data of industrial processes. Visualizations designed for
anomaly detection in network activity are not suitable for this task
since the typical periodic behavior is not taken into account or is
even classified as an indicator for malware activity. In addition, all
anomaly detection systems we have considered above aim on providing
information for cyber security experts. Oftentimes an assessment of
the situation by laymen is impossible due to the complexity of the
visualizations and systems. Our visualization combines visualization
of sensor data and anomaly detection in a way that renders monitoring
and basic triage analysis by laymen possible. As such, it is suitable to
monitor not only anomalies in the process but also the normal behavior.
Operators supervising the considered process are able to monitor
security at the same time if no dedicated security personnel is available.
3 APPLICATION BACKGROUND AND CHALLENGES
3.1 Application and Used Data Set
Our visualization system was developed in collaboration with cyber
security experts from the German Research Center for Artificial Intelli-
gence, whose research focuses on detecting attacks on industrial pro-
cesses from monitoring of OT network sensor readings. This approach
is appropriate for distributed OT networks with difficult to maintain
or outdated components. Because the infrastructure might not provide
basic security features like encryption or authentication, security must
be created using the data sources at hand. In our application, these
data sources are PLCs monitoring a modern six-stage process of water
treatment. The data set containing a real-world underlying process with
introduced attacks is provided by the iTrust, Centre for Research in
cyber security, Singapore University of Technology and Design [19,22].
All attacks are documented, so ground truth comparison of the results
is possible.
To provide an overview of our visualization system and its strengths,
we consider the development of two components with illustrative re-
sults, namely sensor DPIT301 and actuator LIT401. For purpose and
location of these components in the considered water treatment process
see Section 6 and Figure 9.
3.2 Anomaly Detection
The setting of monitored sensor data in industrial processes differs fun-
damentally from monitored network activity in IT networks. While in
Fig. 3. The visualization system: Time slider [A], spiral chart [B] and options menu [C]. The time slider gives an overview on the complete available
data and contained anomalies. In the spiral chart, every sensor is represented by a spiral plot winding from the center to the border. It encodes the
measured data in color and the anomaly score as line thickness.
the latter, periodic patterns indicate attacks, in the former the absence of
frequent patterns or periodicity indicates anomalies. Thus, three differ-
ent approaches for anomaly detection based on prediction/comparison
of the measurements were implemented and evaluated by Duque Anton
et al. [11], namely one-class support vector machines, isolation forests
and matrix profiles. While the first two approaches are one-class clas-
sifiers that analyze the data on a packet basis, i.e. step by step, matrix
profiles are used to perform a time series analysis of a given complete
time frame. One-class classifiers require extensive training with a large
amount of data. This is time consuming and the data might not be easy
to acquire. Even though the detection capabilities of matrix profiles are
increased with a larger data base for comparison, they do not require
formal training. Furthermore, compared to tuning on hyper-parameters
of the used one-class classifiers, matrix profiles require very little tun-
ing. This makes the detection easy to set up and robust to different
kinds of data. Based on these facts and the obtained results for the
considered data set, matrix profiles turned out to be most suitable for
the task of anomaly detection. Hence, only results obtained from this
approach are considered here.
Matrix profiles as described by Yeh et al. were developed as an
algorithm for motif discovery [30]. They are based on the comparison
of intervals of the analyzed data with the remainder of the data. A
distance (e.g. z-normalized distance) between the current sub-series of
a given length and all other sub-series of the same length is calculated
every time the considered interval is shifted by one. An interactive
application of matrix profiles can be found at [1]. The minimal found
distance is then used as measurement for the anomaly of the current
interval, the anomaly score. Thus, the algorithm checks if the consid-
ered development occurs at other time points as well. To avoid missing
attacks that are executed multiple times, a counter for close intervals
was implemented and taken into account when rating the anomaly prob-
ability. If an event is found more infrequent than other events, it is
likely to be an anomaly.
The final result of the anomaly detection algorithm is a score for
every timestep and every sensor that indicates the probability of an
anomaly at this time point. These scores are divided into three cate-
gories:
I values where an anomaly is unlikely,
II values that are extraordinarily high but are not high enough to
clearly indicate malicious activity and
III values where an anomaly is very likely.
The thresholds used for this categorization can be adapted to the used
anomaly detection. If not meaningful in a given context, category II
can be omitted from analysis by setting the thresholds accordingly.
The thresholds in the presented application have been chosen based on
the values obtained from anomaly detection on normal data. Having
a small range in which values are classified as category II directly
above the range obtained when considering normal data provides a
buffer for possible normal values with slightly higher results and thus
increases the credibility of category III. While anormal behavior might
arise from sources different than malicious activity, it should always be
noticed and investigated. Furthermore, the basic idea of using anomaly
detection to detect attacks is that attacking the system will lead to
anormal values.
3.3 State-of-the-art analysis
Up to now, verification of detected anomalies was performed using
basic time series visualizations as in Figure 2. Five anomalies are
detected in the given time frame using matrix profiles. While the matrix
profiles detect anomalies with a sufficiently high probability, they do
not indicate why an anomaly was detected. Identifying the reason
for the anomaly detection is challenging in this setting, as well as
the assessment of detected anomalies as true or false positives. For
example, moderate changes in the periodical behavior of the data are
missed easily. Hence, a more elaborate visualization is needed to
support triage analysis, making use of the periodic behavior of sensors
and actuators and supporting the understanding of anomaly detection
results.
Fig. 4. Interactive adjustment of cycle duration: (left) automatically
detected period in seconds, (right) manually adjusted period.
Fig. 5. Anomaly score visualization: (left) the anomaly score is visualized
as line thickness, (right) anomaly score visualization is turned off.
4 SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
While anomaly detection is a first step towards an early detection of
attacks on the industrial process, its results need to be visualized for
verification. The following requirements for our visualization system
have been identified in cooperation with cyber security experts:
R1 System monitoring and triage analysis should be supported simul-
taneously.
R2 Detected anomalies should be clearly highlighted in the data.
R3 Classification of values in category II as abnormal or normal,
R4 identification of false positives should be possible using the visu-
alization system.
R5 The displayed information and the interaction possibilities should
allow identification of false negatives.
R6 The visualization system should render triage analysis by experts
as well as by laymen (in terms of cyber security) possible.
In addition, depending on the algorithm used for anomaly detection,
live monitoring of the system should be possible where new values are
added to the data set at a given frequency.
5 VISUALIZATION SYSTEM
Our visualization system was designed according to the system re-
quirements given in Section 4. An example application is available at
https://priest.cs.uni-kl.de/˜lohfink.
5.1 User Interface
The user interface consists of three main parts as shown in Figure 3.
The time slider [A] represents the complete data set and provides an
overview and the temporal navigation for the spiral chart [B]. This
chart represents the main area of the visualization system. It provides
a detailed view on the time interval chosen in the time slider using
one spiral plot per selected sensor. The options menu [C] is hidden
by default. Here, all visualization options can be chosen and sensors
can be included or excluded from visualization. Also, the theme of
the whole visualization system can be switched between light and dark
mode. Figures 4 to 7 illustrate the introduction of this component’s
features. Requirements leading to decisions in the design process of
single features are named in parentheses.
5.2 Overview and Detail
As shown in Figure 2, the time slider represents the entire provided data
and highlights detected intervals of categories II (potential anomaly)
and III (anomaly). This is done across all available sensors, providing
an overview of the process status (R1, R2). From the complete available
data, a time frame can be selected interactively to obtain detailed
information in the spiral chart. The maximum size of the selected time
frame is set to four hours, covering 14,400 values at one data point per
second. This size was chosen based on the experience of the involved
security experts. The size of the spiral plots was chosen accordingly.
If needed, spiral plot size and the maximum visualized length can be
adapted easily.
The spiral chart contains visualizations of monitored data and
anomaly detection for every selected sensor during the selected time
frame. To fully exploit the periodicity of the data and the possibility to
detect anomalies visually, we chose spiral plots for this visualization
(R1, R3-6) [29]. Our configuration of spiral plots is the following:
The time axis is winding from the center of the spiral to the cir-
cumference (Figure 3). That is, the most recent time point is always
shown in the largest, outermost circle at the top, highlighted by a small
circular marker in corresponding color (R1). This is especially help-
ful when using the system in live mode, where new data is streamed
continuously in the visualization. New data points are added on the
largest, outermost circle of the spiral, providing most details for the
most recent time interval. Changes in the streamed measurements are
accentuated by the change of the marker’s color. As the endpoint of the
spiral is fixed, widening the visualized time frame results in growing
of the spiral towards the center. The earliest visualized time point is
represented by the end of the spiral closest to its center.
The initial cycle length of each spiral is estimated using the zero-
crossing method on the corresponding sensor readings. As suggested in
[29] by Weber et al. the cycle length of each spiral can be manipulated
interactively, thus taking advantage of the user’s pattern recognition
abilities to increase the accuracy of the presented period length (see
Figure 4). It also allows an adaption of the cycle length to a change
in the data’s periodical behavior during analysis (R1, R3-6). Such
a change could for example be provoked by operator interventions
as explained by Caselli et al. [7]. An example is given in Section 6.
Increasing the cycle length, more timesteps are visualized per cycle
and the overall spiral becomes shorter with less revolutions. On the
other hand, decreasing the cycle length results in fewer timesteps per
cycle and thus in a longer overall spiral with more revolutions that
ends closer to the center. Since the periodical behaviors of different
sensor readings are a priori independent, the period for each spiral plot
is treated individually.
Colors in the spiral represent the different sensor readings either
relative to all available measurements obtained by the considered sensor
or relative to the currently visualized time frame. The first option is
suitable to compare values of the currently selected time frame to the
overall values while the second one gives more detail on behavior of
the data in the current time frame. Among others, the Parula colormap
is available which is suitable for people with color blindness.
The pre-attentive attribute of line thickness [5] is used to provide
information on the calculated anomaly score at each time point, i.e. the
probability for an anomaly calculated by the employed detector (R2,
R6): The thicker a line is, the more likely an anomaly occurred. Values
of category III are of a given maximal thickness, values of category I
of a given minimal thickness and values in between (category II) inter-
polate between maximal and minimal thickness. To gain an overview
of just the data, the spiral plot can optionally be drawn with a constant
line thickness (R1) (see Figure 5).
As soon as the cursor hovers over any spiral on screen, the corre-
sponding colormap and value range are shown, and a spotlight follows
the cursor to facilitate linking between time points on spirals. This
spotlight will always highlight the closest point on the spiral. Simul-
taneously, spotlights in all other spirals highlight the corresponding
time point according to their cycle length in linked views. Due to the
fact that every spiral shows the same number of time steps but with
different cycle length, outermost and innermost points of all spirals
coincide. In between, the speeds of the spotlights differ. Keeping the
spotlight behind the actual spiral visualization enables the user to easily
compare single data points at each visualized time point (R1, R3-6)
(See Figure 6).
5.3 Anomaly Highlighting
Detected (potential) anomalies are highlighted in the time slider as
well as in the spiral chart (R2). Across the entire visualization system,
categories II and III are marked consistently in yellow and red with
easily distinguished symbols (question mark and exclamation mark).
If both categories II and III are present, the highlighting for the more
problematic category III is chosen.
In the time slider, time frames where any available sensor provided
suspicious data are highlighted. The slider bar is colored accordingly in
these areas. Centered above the colored area the corresponding symbol
is shown. Clicking on this symbol, time frame selection is fitted to
the corresponding area. In addition, all sensors where the (potential)
anomaly was detected are selected for visualization, ensuring that the
users are able to identify all affected sensors. After a time frame
including data points from categories II or III was selected, further
highlighting is provided in the spiral chart.
In this detailed view, to emphasize the occurrence of (potential)
anomalies in the data, the corresponding symbol is displayed in the
center of spirals that contain data categorized as II or III. See for
example sensors LIT101 and DPIT301 in Figure 3. Especially if the
anomaly score visualization is deactivated and the line thickness of the
spiral plots is constant, these symbols ensure that no occurring attack
is missed. Hovering over the symbol in a spiral’s center, data points
contained in the spiral plot of categories II and III are highlighted in
the corresponding colors. To further draw attention to the highlighted
areas and to ensure that the highlighting colors are not mistaken as part
of the used colormap, line thickness is animated (see Figure 7) (R3, R4,
R6).
5.4 Interaction
Multiple interaction opportunities are provided to support monitoring
of the process and triage analysis of detected anomalies (R1, R6):
Navigating the overall data by manipulating the time slider is pos-
sible in multiple ways: The borders of the selected time frame can be
adjusted by dragging the border markers or clicking on the slider. If the
maximum size of the selection is exceeded, the border that is currently
not dragged is adjusted to obtain a valid interval. To shift the entire se-
lected time frame while keeping its current size, the arrow buttons next
to the slider can be clicked. Precisely known time points (if available)
can be entered directly below the slider in the time frame information.
Clicking on symbols indicating (potential) anomalies adjusts the time
frame to include all corresponding time points and selects all affected
sensors for visualization.
After the time frame is fixed, the plots on the spiral chart can be
adjusted individually. Clicking on a spiral, a slider to interactively
manipulate the spirals cycle length is shown. Options applying to all
shown spiral plots are available in the options menu. The colormap
and its borders can be changed and visualizing results from anomaly
detection as line width can be toggled. To be able to focus on individ-
ual sensor readings, uninteresting sensors can be excluded from the
visualization.
5.5 Implementation and Scalability
The visualization system was implemented using web technologies
(HTML, CSS, and JavaScript) in the interest of portability and main-
tainability. The controls are chosen to permit usage of the visualization
system on touch screens. Significant speedups compared to a naı¨ve
implementation were gained by rendering the spirals using a given
threshold ε and a maximal line length k. A line is started at the first
drawn timestep and traced step by step with step size defined by the
spiral’s cycle length. As long as the first encountered data point of the
line does not differ more than ε from the following data points, a single
line with a single color is drawn. The line either ends when a higher
difference occurs or the maximal length k is reached. Hence, there are
Fig. 6. Spotlights: Highlighting the hovered timestep in every spiral
simplifies linking of concurrent features.
Fig. 7. Anomaly highlighting: (left) No highlighting, (right) areas of cate-
gories II and III are colored accordingly and line thickness is animated.
less lines drawn than timesteps are contained in the spiral, leading to
a speedup in rendering time. This precludes a highlighting of single
timesteps in the spiral, therefore the spotlight calculation does not rely
on drawn elements but is purely analytical. Spirals were implemented
using the HTML SVG element, re-calculation and re-drawing were
minimized. In our tests, 51 different sensors were shown at a time and
smooth real time-interaction was possible. This holds also true when
settings are changed.
Showing significantly more than the 51 sensors would result in
longer loading times, and scrolling a long page full of sensors would
not be optimal. Having different sub-pages with a meaningful division
of the sensors would facilitate the navigation, provide a better overview
and allow the system to asynchronously load additional sensor data.
Thus interactivity on single pages is assured. To mark potential threats
on different sub-pages, the established icons and colors could be used.
This is part of our future work.
6 ANALYSIS STRATEGIES AND USAGE SCENARIO
To evaluate results from the anomaly detection in Figure 8, our vi-
sualization system was employed. The considered data set contains
sensor readings from a modern six-stage process of water treatment.
The monitored sub-processes are:
P1: Raw water storage,
P2: Pre-treatment,
P3: Membrane Ultra Filtration (UF),
P4: Dechlorination by Ultraviolet (UV) lamps,
P5: Reverse Osmosis (RO),
P6: Disposal
Connections between the sub-processes are shown in Figure 9.
The digital part of the system consists of a layered OT-network,
PLCs, human machine interfaces and a Supervisory Control And Data
Acquisition (SCADA) workstation. PLCs are industrial digital comput-
ers that are tailored to controlling manufacturing processes and can be
connected to sensors and actuators. In total, 51 sensors and actuators
are controlled by the PLCs. A detailed list including a description can
be found in [13]. Here, also the attacks contained in the data set and
their occurrences are described.
Sensors DPIT301, the differential pressure indicating transmitter
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Fig. 8. Anomaly detection results (extended Figure 2): Ground truth is
provided and detected anomalies are highlighted.
P1 P2
P3
P4
P5 P6a
P6b
xx
DPIT301LIT401
Raw Water 
Tank
Mixer
UF Feed
Tank
UF Feed
PumpUF System
RO Feed
Tank
RO Feed
PumpUV System
Dechlorin.
NaHSO3
Cartridge
Filter RO System
UF Back-
wash Tank
UF Back-
wash Pump
RO Perme-
ate Tank
xAIT504
MV101 LIT101
Attacked during #2
Attacked during #3
UV401
AIT502
P501
Attacked during #5
P602
MV302
Considered
Pump Pump HCl NaOCl NaCl
Fig. 9. Sub-processes of the used data set and their interplay: Attacked
components and the sensor and actuator considered in the usage sce-
nario are highlighted.
controlling the back-wash process in stage P3, and the actuator LIT401
reporting the water tank level of the tank in stage P4 are considered in
this usage scenario. See Figure 9 for the location of these components
in the overall process. The analyzed data consists of 10,000 samples
of normal behavior as a “base line” to compare occurring patterns
to, and 28,000 samples containing five attacks. Five anomalies have
been detected in the readings of sensor DPIT301. For sensor LIT401,
just one anomaly, coinciding with the first anomaly in DPIT301, was
detected (not shown here). This first detection is an artifact at the edge
between normal data and data containing attacks. Furthermore, the 4th
detection in the readings of DPIT301 is a false positive. In Figure 8 the
detected anomalies and corresponding areas in the sensor readings are
highlighted. In addition, the ground truth is given, where value 1 stands
for an attack. For every anomaly, a different analysis strategy that
is supported by our visualization tool is applied. The five exemplary
situations are:
• Period disruption: A sudden change in the period of the measure-
ments occurs.
• Abnormal occurrence of values: Values that are in the normal
range occur at an abnormal time point or for an abnormal length.
• Phase shift: The period of the measurement changes phase shift.
• False positive
• Abnormal values: Values outside the normal range occur.
The peaks were evaluated one by one as follows:
Detected anomaly #1, period disruption: This detection is
caused by the edge between normal data and data containing attacks.
The combination of two data sets caused a period disruption and a
sudden change in values.
In our visualization system both effects are visible: The period of
DPIT301 in the normal data previous to any attacks was perfectly
identified by the period estimation (Figure 10). Widening the
Fig. 10. The period of DPIT301 before the first anomaly.
considered time interval to include the detected anomaly provides
insight in the reasons for the detection (Figure 11): Clearly, the period
of DPIT301 is disrupted in the area that was detected as abnormal
(left). In addition, the small, abrupt increase in the values of LIT401 is
visible, especially if the jet colormap is chosen (right).
Fig. 11. Anomaly #1: (left) Disrupted period, (right) abrupt increase.
Detected anomaly #2, abnormal occurrence of values: Three short
attacks in rapid succession lead to this abnormal behavior. Two attacks
were executed on permeate conductivity analyser AIT504 measuring
the NaCl level in sub-process 5 at the reverse osmosis system. The
expected outcome was missed and the attacks did not lead to much
change in the data. The third attack was on the motorized valve MV101
that controls the water flow to the raw water tank at the beginning of
the process and level transmitter LIT101 controlling the raw water tank
level. The valve is kept on while the transmitter is kept on a constant
level, avoiding a shutdown of the valve. This leads to an overflow of
the raw water tank and propagates further through the system, causing
lagging.
This lagging is clearly visible using our system: After anomaly #1,
the readings of DPIT301 re-start their periodical behavior with a phase
shift. After one cycle, the next anomaly is detected, resulting in an
extraordinarily long phase with low values. Although the new period is
not yet well established, this phase clearly stands out from the data and
is obviously the reason for the detected anomaly (Figure 12). Hence
the visualization leads to the correct classification of the detected
anomaly as an attack.
Detected anomaly #3, phase shift: Here, the abnormal behav-
ior was triggered by an attack on the dechlorinator UV401 in
sub-process 4 used to remove the chlorine from the water. It was
stopped and the value of oxidation-reduction potential analyser AIT502
monitoring the NaOCl level in the reverse osmosis feed was fixed to
prevent an alert. In addition, the pump P501 pumping dechlorinated
water to the reverse osmosis system was kept on. During the attack it
was not possible to force P501 to stay on; so a possible damage was
anormal long phase 
with minimal values
at anomaly two
New period, established 
after first anomaly
Fig. 12. Anomaly #2: An extraordinarily long phase with minimal values
for DPIT301.
avoided and the chlorine loaded water was rejected at sub-process 6.
This leads to higher input in the ultrafiltration process which is visible
in the readings of DPIT301 and LIT401 using our system after an
adaption of the period:
After anomaly #2, the period of DPIT301 from the second data set
containing the attacks is fully established. The estimated cycle length
is no longer valid and the periodicity is not easy to spot. The cycle
length of the visualization can be easily adapted so that a further
analysis of the period is possible (Figure 13).
Fig. 13. Cycle length adjustment: (left) Automatically detected period
length, (right) after manual adjustment.
At detected anomaly #3, periods of DPIT301 and LIT401 change
the phase shift. Although in LIT401 no anomaly was detected, this
shift is clearly visible in our visualization system after adapting the
cycle length (Figure 14). This identifies the detected anomaly as an
attack (which is confirmed by the ground truth). The phase shift of
LIT401 is also difficult to spot in Figure 8, leading us to the impression
that our visualization system is indeed superior to naı¨ve time series
visualizations.
Fig. 14. Anomaly #3: Period shift
Detected anomaly #4, false positive: Around detected anomaly #4,
no changes in values or periods are visible. Hence, an attack at this
time point is doubtable. In fact, this detected anomaly is a false
positive that can be identified fairly easy using our visualization system
(Figure 15).
Fig. 15. Anomaly #4 is a false positive. No anormal behavior can be
spotted visually.
Detected anomaly #5, abnormal values: The triggering attack for
this anomaly detection involved keeping the backwash pump P602 in
sub-process 6 closed, setting the value of DPIT301 to a high value and
keeping the motorized valve MV302 that controls the flow from the
ultrafiltration process to the de-chlorination unit open. This leads to
a system freeze since no water from the backwash pump is available
while water transport from sub-process 3 to 4 is kept active. The
reverse osmosis feed tank runs dry.
Again, this attack is clearly visible in our system. Even tracing the
origin of the attack is possible: At the time frame of detected anomaly
#5, the values of both sensors change tremendously and fast, indicating
an attack. Choosing the colormap relative to the current time frame,
this is easy to see for both sensors, making it easy to correctly classify
this anomaly as an attack (Figure 16).
Fig. 16. Anomaly #5: (left) sudden increase in DPIT301, (right) rapid
decrease in LIT401.
The direct attack on DPIT301 and also the drop in values in LIT401
caused by the dry running tank are clearly visible. In addition, the
succession of visible effects that can be traced using the spotlights indi-
cates that the attack first affected DPIT301 and propagated to LIT401
afterwards. This provides a hint on the origin of the attack. At the
beginning of the manipulation of values in DPIT301, the anomaly de-
tection provides values from category II, as the value remains unusually
high, category III is detected. This increase in values (and thus line
thickness) is shown clearly. Hovering the alert icon at the spiral center,
the segment of category II will be highlighted in yellow, the segment of
category III in red.
Overall, our visualization system proved useful in supporting cyber
security experts in their triage analysis tasks. Feedback of the experts
is given in Section 7.2.
7 EVALUATION
7.1 Qualitative Evaluation
Our visualization system was evaluated in cooperation with the HCI
group at the Technische Universita¨t Kaiserslautern. To assess require-
ment R6, the ability of laymen (in terms of cyber security) to verify
Question  SD
Q1a Identify a current anomaly 100% 0
Q1b Determine first time of occurrence of a
thread
79% 0.43
Q2a Determine the period of a sensor with a
single peak per period
64% 0.5
Q2b Determine the period of a sensor with mul-
tiple peaks per period
50% 0.5
Q3 Determine the sensors that are affected by
an anomaly
93% 0.27
Q4a Identify a true positive 93% 0.27
Q4b Identify a false positive 85% 0.38
Q5a Classify an area of category II as attack 100% 0
Q5b Classify an area of category II as normal 93% 0.27
Q6a Spot suspicious measurements in an area
that was detected as normal
100% 0
Q6b Determine the sensor with abnormal be-
havior
93% 0.27
Table 1. Amount of successful participants and standard deviation.
results of the anomaly detection, the evaluation was performed with
15 subjects, where 11 have a technical background (IT/electrical en-
gineering) and none have experience in cyber security. This is also
in consent with the findings of Staheli et al. in [26]. After a short
introduction to the system, the users performed several tasks and filled
the questionnaire on effectiveness along the way. Afterwards, they
were asked to fill a questionnaire on usability of the system.
7.1.1 Effectiveness Results
The requirements defined in Section 4 were assessed based on a ques-
tionnaire with multiple tasks to perform on the secure water treatment
data set. One false positive alert was added to the anomaly detection
data and one alert was deleted to create a false negative. Areas of
category II belonging to categories I and III were already present in the
data.
Participants were asked to:
Q1 identify a current threat,
Q2 determine the periods of some given measurements,
Q3 determine the sensors that are affected by an attack,
Q4 identify true and false positives,
Q5 classify areas of category II as category I or category III and
Q6 spot suspicious measurements in an area detected as normal.
Q1 and Q2 assess R1, the ability to monitor the system and simultane-
ously perform triage analysis. Requirement R2, that requires detected
anomalies to be clearly highlighted in the data is assessed by Q1 and
Q3. The classification of values in category II (R3) is assessed in Q5,
once for each category. The ability to detect false positives with our
system (R4) is tested in Q4 once with a true positive, and once with a
false positive. R5, support of the system to detect false negatives, is
assessed in Q6.
The results for each question are presented in Table 1. All partic-
ipants were able to identify a current potential thread in the system
(Q1a) and 79% were able to determine the first time point a thread
occurs in the overall data correctly (Q1b). The period of sensor data at
a given time interval was determined correctly by 64% in the case of a
period with a single peak (Q2a) and by 50% in the case of a period with
multiple peaks per period (Q2b). While these numbers are comparably
low, 93% of the participants were able to detect some kind of pattern
for a chosen spiral in the spiral plot. Hence, the advantage of spiral plot
visualization concerning the detection of disrupted or shifted periods
is still present, even though the correct period was not found. These
results and the fact that 93% of the participants were able to correctly
determine the sensors that were affected by a detected anomaly (Q3)
lead us to towards opinion that requirements R1 and R2 were imple-
mented successfully in our system. Considering the classification of
T
he
fu
nc
tio
ns
im
pl
em
en
te
d
in
th
e
so
ft
w
ar
e
su
pp
or
tm
e
in
pe
rf
or
m
in
g
m
y
w
or
k
To
o
m
an
y
di
ff
er
en
ts
te
ps
ne
ed
to
be
pe
rf
or
m
ed
to
de
al
w
ith
a
gi
ve
n
ta
sk
T
he
so
ft
w
ar
e
is
w
el
ls
ui
te
d
to
th
e
re
qu
ir
em
en
ts
of
m
y
w
or
k
T
he
im
po
rt
an
tc
om
m
an
ds
re
qu
ir
ed
to
pe
rf
or
m
m
y
w
or
k
ar
e
ea
sy
to
T
he
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n
of
th
e
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
on
th
e
sc
re
en
su
pp
or
ts
m
e
in
pe
rf
or
m
in
g
m
y
w
or
k
T
he
po
ss
ib
ili
tie
s
fo
rn
av
ig
at
in
g
w
ith
in
th
e
so
ft
w
ar
e
ar
e
ad
eq
ua
te
W
he
n
ex
ec
ut
in
g
fu
nc
tio
ns
, I
 h
av
e 
th
e
fe
el
in
g
th
at
th
e
re
su
lts
ar
e
pr
ed
ic
ta
bl
e
In
ee
de
d
a
lo
ng
tim
e
to
le
ar
n
ho
w
to
us
e
th
e
so
ft
w
ar
e
It
is
ea
sy
fo
rm
e
to
re
le
ar
n
ho
w
to
us
e
th
e
so
ft
w
ar
e
af
te
ra
le
ng
th
y
in
te
rr
up
tio
n
fi
nd
Predominantly
disagree
so-so
Predominantly
agree
1
2
3
4
5
Fig. 17. Results (quartiles, median, data range and outliers) per question
in the usability questionnaire. For questions with blue boxplot, high values
are a good result, questions with yellow boxplot require low scores for a
positive result.
values in category II in categories I and III, 100% of all participants
were able to determine an actual attack (Q5a). The decision that an
area of category II is actually normal (Q5b) was made correctly by
93%. With these results, we consider requirement R3 as met. 93%
of all participants were able to identify a detected anomaly as a true
positive (Q4a) and the detection of false positives (Q4b) was performed
with 85% success rate by the participants. Hence, also requirement R4
is met by our system. The supporting character of the system in per-
forming security related tasks is further assessed in the usability study
in Section 7.1.2. Requirement R6 (support of the system in finding
false negatives) was assessed by having the participants navigate to an
area marked as normal by the system that actually contained an attack.
100% of all participants were able to identify this attack (Q6a) and 93%
were able to determine the sensor with abnormal behavior correctly
(Q6b). Since this question was last in our questionnaire, we see this
perfect result as a hint to an existing training effect, that was already
present in a 10 minute survey. Also we consider requirement R5 as met.
Requirement R6, rendering verification by laymen (in terms of cyber
security) possible, was obviously met since all participants were able to
understand their tasks and perform most of them correctly. Overall, the
participants navigated confidently through the data in our visualization
system and were able to make use of the provided features to perform
the tasks even after a very short walk through. The visualization was
described as pleasant, the dark visualization mode was a clear favorite.
7.1.2 Usability Results
Participants of the experiment were also questioned for an assessment
on the usability of the visualization system. The usability questionnaire
according to ISO 9241/10 contained questions about:
• suitability for the task (red),
• controllability (green),
• conformity with user expectations (blue) and
• suitability for learning (purple).
For each question, the participants were asked to respond on a five-
level Likert scale from 1 (Predominantly Disagree) to 5 (Predominantly
Agree). The aggregated results for the dimensions mentioned above are
presented in Figure 17. Suitability of the visualization system for the
performed tasks was evaluated as very good by the participants. In their
opinion, the well-suited and supported commands are relatively easy
to find and not too many steps are necessary to achieve results. Con-
trollability was also rated as very good as well as conformity with user
expectations. Several users suggested to improve the navigation in the
time slider by providing a possibility to enter timestamps directly. This
feature was added after the evaluation. The previous observation that it
is easy to learn how to control the visualization system is confirmed by
the participants impressions.
The effectiveness and usability assessment results shown are pos-
itive. We interpret these results to indicate that the metaphors of our
visualization system are well chosen and that triage analysis in the
industrial context can be effectively supported by it.
7.2 Expert Evaluation
To evaluate usability and usefulness of our visualization system for cy-
ber security experts, an expert evaluation was performed. In the context
of a presentation and application of our system, an expert was inter-
viewed. Considering usability and visual presentation of the application,
the expert’s opinion was very positive. In his judgement, identification
of correctly and incorrectly detected anomalies was easy to accomplish
using our system. Especially the different employed highlighting tech-
niques for anomalies and potential anomalies were convincing. Also
the overall data representation provided a good overview and the max-
imal length of the visualized time frame is well chosen. The expert
stated that our system could be beneficial not only in an industrial cyber
security context, but also for process-level monitoring in industrial
applications when used to augment existing monitoring systems.
As an enhancement of our system, the expert suggested the possibil-
ity to not only visualize continuous time frames but to allow comparison
of discrete time frames. An application example would be periodic
behavior of a process that is not on an hourly scale but develops within
several days. Furthermore, recurring attacks performed by staff or
external employees are conceivable. These would occur only during
certain times of the day, or even at certain days of the week. Hence,
providing the possibility to show spiral plots not only per sensor or
actuator but also per selected time frame is part of our future work.
8 DISCUSSION
In the example usage scenario we found that triage analysis using
our tool was effective, comfortable and superior to naı¨ve time series
visualizations. Each correct anomaly detection could be explained by
different, clearly visualized features in the data. Missing these features
for the false positive easily leads to rejecting the detected anomaly at
hand. Being able to switch the colormap boundaries from “relative to
the whole data set” to “relative to the current time frame” turned out to
be helpful when considering either long-term development in the data
or local behavior, respectively. Clear accentuation of anomalies using
icons, line thickness and highlighting with determined colors leads to
an easy to understand overview of the data and potential anomalies.
Also, we found that periodicity could be monitored effectively and
enabling the user to change the period of the spiral plots not only
increases accuracy of the shown period but also allows the user to react
to changes in the period during the process.
The evaluation with laymen w.r.t. cyber security clearly indicates
that basic triage analysis tasks can indeed be performed by them by
use of our visualization system. Also, monitoring the readings of
available sensors in order to gain an overview of the current process
was possible. We are convinced that staff that is trained to work with
the according machine would perform even better in monitoring and
detecting anomalies in the behavior and could benefit considerably
from our visualization tool.
Hence, we believe our visualization system and anomaly detection
would be a useful tool to make available not only for incident response
or cyber threat hunting teams working in the Operational Technology
environment, but also for industrial companies without dedicated cyber
security staff. In general, industrial control systems providing anomaly
scores on periodical data could profit from our visualization approach.
While all requirements of the given setting were met successfully,
requirements to specifically support comparative analysis are not yet
incorporated. For example, comparing anomalies from two separate
time windows is not possible. In addition, analysis of inter-sensor
relations are currently only supported by the spotlights feature. Widen-
ing our system by these abilities is an interesting task for future work.
Currently, it is up to the user to choose meaningful timeframes from
the data witch might not result in optimal choices. Supporting the user
by suggesting possible choices could further facilitate the handling
of the system. Up to now, the system was designed as a stand-alone
solution that could be available directly at an operative unit. Thus, there
is no possibility to incorporate or share gained knowledge on previous
anomalies and attacks into the system. To provide these possibilities
and to enable the user to share results with other analysts is a big part
of our future work that will greatly benefit from the browser-based
implementation of the system. In the current implementation, the visu-
alization of the sensors is not connected to the physical location of the
sensors in the machines due to space-reasons. Splitting the sensors in
meaningful groups (f.ex. one per sub-process) could solve this problem
and allow the inclusion of references to the real sensor locations in
the visualization. In addition, this will improve the scalability of the
system.
9 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we presented a novel visualization system for triage
analysis and monitoring of Operational Technology networks, based on
a novel anomaly detection in these networks. The visualization system
exploits typical patterns that are often inherent in sensor and actuator
readings from industrial processes to the fullest to enable cyber security
experts and laymen to perform triage analysis and monitoring of the
system simultaneously. The main characteristic of our visualization
system is manipulable spiral graphs that combine the visualization of
sensor readings in their coloring with the results from anomaly detection
in their line thickness. Anomalies are highlighted using further pre-
attentive properties like form, movement and dedicated colors. We
presented an example usage scenario, demonstrating the usefulness
and effectiveness of our system in triage analysis and monitoring. Our
system’s effectiveness was evaluated in a small user study by cyber
security laymen and an expert evaluation was performed. The results
were very promising and were discussed in detail.
Further development of our system will involve widening of its scope
of application and extension of tools to support comparison of two
separate anomalies from two separate time windows and inter-sensor
relations. One option to implement this would be by superimposing
spiral plots. Proposing meaningful timeframes based on the results from
anomaly detection could further improve the usability of the system
and will be considered as well. Providing possibilities to incorporate
gained knowledge in the system and to cooperate with other users
will be considered. Based on the browser implementation, this could
span from annotating and marking interesting timeframes to storing
data snippets of interest for comparison and adapting thresholds and
anomaly detection of the system dynamically. Finally, a referenced
visualization of physical sensor locations in the machines to support
orientation and consequently the meaningful division of the sensors in
groups is part of our future work. Moreover, embedding operational
constraints in the visualization could be possible, e.g. by putting sensor
visualizations into context of an annotated layout plan containing these
constraints.
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